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With more universities conducting low-cost small satellite development programs, resources for students starting off 
in satellite design are essential to avoid common pitfalls. Hardware integration and testing of the GT-1 CubeSat 
revealed both design flaws and strengths that led to a comprehensive list of lessons learned applicable to future 
CubeSat missions at the Georgia Institute of Technology Space Systems Design Laboratory (SSDL) and within the 
broader academic community. GT-1 was originally slated to be designed, built, and delivered in nine months with an 
orbital lifespan of around seven months. However, various schedule delays resulted in the mission spanning over 
two years. This paper provides a resource to those beginning a small satellite development program at the university 
level by presenting a case study of lessons learned from the GT-1 mission. Detail will be provided for topics 
including best practices for enabling modular design, creating effective documentation, structural design for proper 
fit-up and manufacturability, testing, and planning a realistic mission scope. 
INTRODUCTION 
The GT-1 mission demonstrates a rapid cradle-to-grave 
lifecycle of a university level CubeSat and is the first in 
a series of at least four 1U CubeSats to be developed 
and launched approximately annually by the Space 
Systems Design Laboratory at Georgia Tech. These 
missions are intended to train undergraduate students in 
all aspects of a space mission while producing a 
working satellite bus as a foundation for demonstrating 
experimental technologies. As such, the GT-1 mission 
is run almost entirely by undergraduate students 
performing hardware design, structural analysis, 
software development, integration and testing, and on-
orbit operation. 
GT-1 contains a software payload that will allow 
amateur radio operators around the world to 
communicate with the spacecraft as it orbits the Earth. 
An experimental UHF antenna deployment mechanism 
is utilized to constrain the stowed antenna within the 
chassis of the spacecraft. Prototype deployable solar 
panels enable the spacecraft to support approximately 
600 cm2 of solar cells, more than double the surface 
area a typical 1U can support, providing capacity for 
power-intensive payloads on future missions. 
GT-1 is manifested by Spaceflight Inc. (a Launch 
Service Provider) to be launched to the International 
Space Station on CRS-24 in a December 2021 resupply 
mission where it will be deployed from the Japanese 
Experimental Module into a low Earth orbit (LEO) with 
an approximate lifetime of 7 months. This will be one 
of the first missions supported by the GT Mission 
Operations Center and is in partnership with W4AQL 
(the Georgia Tech Amateur Radio Club). 
 
Figure 1: GT-1 CubeSat 
The following discussion details some of the major 
lessons learned during the development of this 
spacecraft. This report is intended to serve as a 
reference for university or other teams designing and 
constructing their first CubeSat mission, but it may also 
introduce more experienced groups to alternative 
design, integration, and test philosophies. First, the 
mission requirements and spacecraft design overview 
are described. Then, several major lessons learned are 
explored in depth with first-hand accounts describing 
what was experienced during the GT-1 mission and 
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explanations of what actions are recommended by the 
team on future missions. 
MISSION REQUIREMENTS 
As is common across CubeSat missions, the use of a 
standardized deployment method introduces additional 
interface considerations. Thus, the driving requirements 
for the GT-1 mission can be separated into two distinct 
varieties: design requirements needed to achieve the 
mission minimum success criteria and those pertaining 
to the interface with the deployer provided by the 
Japanese Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA). 
JEM Payload Requirements 
The Japanese Experimental Module (JEM) Payload 
Requirements serve as the Interface Control Document 
(ICD) for the Japanese Small Satellite Orbital Deployer 
– Reusable (JSSOD-R), which is the deployment 
mechanism JAXA will use for the GT-1 mission. The 
JSSOD-R install cases are designed to accept rail-based 
spacecraft up to 3U in size adhering to the Cal Poly 
CubeSat Design Specification1, so many of the 
mechanical interface requirements flow down from this 
standard. While a majority of the JEM Payload 
Accommodation Handbook2 is out of scope for this 
discussion, certain requirements are discussed which 
are of particular relevance to the design process and 
resulting lessons learned over the development life of 
GT-1.  
The dimensional requirements for a 1U CubeSat flow 
directly from the Cal Poly Standard – an exterior rail 
profile of 100 mm x 100 mm x 111.5 mm with a 0.1 
mm tolerance to allow for a clearance slide-fit with the 
JSSOD-R install case. The JEM Accommodation 
Handbook includes additional specifications for rail 
parallelism and perpendicularity within 0.2 mm. These 
specifications can be difficult to verify due to the need 
for a reference datum and complex measuring 
techniques. However, it is important to monitor this 
specification throughout the entire fabrication and 
assembly process as an out-of-specification structure 
will bind the satellite in the install case. 
The battery protection requirements for GT-1 in the 
Accommodation Handbook are supplemented by those 
in JDX-2017078-0A4. JAXA classifies all CubeSat 
batteries as a “catastrophic hazard” per JSC-207935 
(NASA’s Crewed Space Vehicle Battery Safety 
Requirements) which requires three inhibits for battery 
over-charge, over-discharge, and external short events. 
Software inhibits are possible, but verification is 
challenging, so hardware inhibits are strongly preferred. 
Inhibits can reside in the battery cells, EPS unit, or the 
spacecraft avionics so long as this requirement is met 
between the battery and the load as well as between the 
battery and the solar panels of the spacecraft. Note that 
one of these inhibits must explicitly be placed in-line 
with the battery ground return. 
 
 
Figure 2: JSSOD with coordinate system (top)2 and 
deployer on ISS3 (bottom) 
JAXA also requires satisfactory completion of vibration 
and thermal cycling environmental tests. Vibration 
testing has two aspects: frequency analysis and random 
vibration. These tests must be performed along each of 
the three body axes. Frequency analysis using a sine 
sweep is performed before and after random vibration 
testing to identify the fundamental frequency mode and 
higher order modes. Large frequency or amplitude 
shifts of these modes, indicative of a failed component, 
are undesirable and may require further analysis, retest, 
or disassembly of the spacecraft to investigate. The 
random vibration profile is launch vehicle specific – in 
the case of GT-1, a SpaceX Dragon profile was 
baselined. To pass the thermal cycling tests the 
spacecraft shall satisfy all performance and safety 
requirements stated in the JEM Handbook at dwell 
temperatures of –15 and 60 degrees Celsius. 
GT-1 Minimum Success Criteria Requirements 
While the JEM Payload Requirements limited what 
payload the GT-1 team could deploy from the ISS, 
additional Mission Success Criteria were imposed to 
ensure the mission had scientific and educational merit. 
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Establishing these criteria is especially important as 
they provide a foundation for future missions to expand 
from and provide flight heritage to increase the 
Technology Readiness Level (TRL) of the prototype 
systems onboard. Table 1 details the minimum and full 
mission success criteria. These minimum success 
criteria were used to drive go/no-go flight decisions and 
determine whether descoping of certain criteria or 
components was plausible. 
 
Table 1: GT-1 Mission Success Criteria 
Criteria Minimum Full 
Prototype Solar Panel Deployables X  
Custom Footprint OpenLST Radio with Deployable Antenna X  
Telecommand and Telemetry Communications System with Beacon X  
Functional EPS subsystem with Latchup Protection X  
Current and Voltage Monitoring of Subsystems  X 
FSW State Machine and Rate Groups X  
Over-The-Air FSW Update Capability  X 
B-Dot Controller and Torque Rods Allowing for Detumble X  
Full-State Attitude Estimation Using Magnetometer, Sun Sensors, GPS, and IMU  X 
Well Documented Design and Integration & Test Documentation Providing Baseline for Future Missions X  
 
GT-1 DESIGN OVERVIEW 
The spacecraft electrical power system (EPS), 
command and data handling (CDH) and attitude 
determination and control (ADC) systems are explained 
briefly in the following sections. A basic understanding 
of the spacecraft design will be necessary in extracting 
useful information from the subsequent lessons learned 
sections. 
Electrical Power System 
The core of the GT-1 EPS is the GomSpace P31u 
(Figure 3), a highly integrated PCB with two lithium 
ion 18650 battery cells, maximum power point tracking 
(MPPT) solar panel chargers, and latch-up protected 
power supplies. Additionally, the spacecraft contains 
four “static” solar panels mounted on opposite X and Y 
faces of the structure and four double-sided 
“deployable” solar panels. Each panel contains two 
Spectrolab XTJ Prime solar cells in series, with the 
exception of one static solar panel containing a single 
cell to allow clearance for antenna deployment. When 
not in eclipse, the spacecraft will always have some 
solar cell area in direct sunlight, alleviating any 
pointing requirements driven by the EPS. 
 
Figure 3: GomSpace P31u6 
Command and Data Handling 
Command and data handling is conducted by a custom 
flight computer (Figure 4) using a radiation tolerant 
ATmega128 microcontroller running flight software 
based on NASA’s F’ (F Prime) framework. The 
ATmega128’s vast community support and tools 
through the Arduino community helped to get the flight 
software team running programs on the flight computer 
very quickly with little development environment 
overhead, which is a large advantage in a student-
developed CubeSat mission. 
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Figure 4: GT-1 Flight Computer 
The flight software team had difficulties fitting all the 
desired software components into the 128 kB program 
memory of the ATmega128. Estimating the required 
program memory using NASA’s new F’ framework 
was difficult for GT-1, as the framework had never 
been used on an ATmega128 microcontroller. Future 
small satellite projects using experimental software 
should consider applying large margins to the allocated 
program memory on the flight computer. 
Additionally, an Onion Omega2 microprocessor is 
onboard the spacecraft for performing more complex 
and faster computations than what the ATmega128 can 
provide, at the cost of greater power consumption.  The 
Onion Omega2 is not utilized for flight-critical 
functions due to its lack of heritage in the space 
environment but is used for managing the amateur radio 
communications payload and for commanding the ADC 
system. 
Battery Hazard Inhibit 
The battery hazard inhibit circuit is responsible for 
preventing damage to the battery as a result of over-
charge, over-discharge, and external short fault 
conditions. Typically, this circuit “inhibits” the battery 
from powering the spacecraft until after deployment so 
that a battery fault while in storage or transit does not 
result in an explosion or battery leakage. 
GT-1’s inhibit circuit is shown in Figure 5. Only a few 
of the hazard protections are supplied by the GomSpace 
P31u, namely the PTC/CID protection and “Protection 
IC” blocks. The remainder of the hazard protections 
were implemented in GT-1’s custom electronics which 
include the solar panel blocking diodes and the “GND 
Break MOSFETs”. These MOSFETs disconnect the 
battery from the spacecraft ground while the satellite is 
not deployed. 
Understanding this circuit is critical to the success of a 
small satellite mission both in meeting launch provider 
requirements and in maximizing the reliability of the 
successful deployment of the spacecraft. The GT-1 
team misunderstood the inhibit circuit requirements 
until late in the spacecraft integration process, requiring 
an undesirable modification of hardware to bring the 
circuit into compliance. 
 
Figure 5: GT-1 Battery Hazard Inhibit Circuit 
Communications 
The spacecraft communicates with the ground using a 
custom 1W UHF radio operating in the 70cm amateur 
band at 9600 bps. The radio is based on the open-source 
OpenLST design (Figure 6) released by Planet Labs for 
small satellite projects, which uses the Texas 
Instruments CC1110 radio transceiver IC. Since the 
OpenLST firmware and CC1110 do not support 
amateur radio AX.25 packet protocol and G3RUH 
scrambling, the firmware was modified to support these 
amateur standards. This allows for GT-1 to 
communicate not only with the Georgia Tech ground 
stations, but with the many licensed amateur radio 
operators around the world. 
However, implementing the AX.25 packet framing, 
G3RUH scrambling, and other data manipulation in 
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software caused long delays in the project timeline and 
reduced the data rate due to saturation of the 
processor’s performance. Selecting a radio transceiver 
IC that supports the mission’s required radio data 
manipulation in hardware will speed up the radio 
development process considerably. 
 
Figure 6: Planet Labs OpenLST Radio7 
Attitude Determination and Control 
The spacecraft attitude determination system includes a 
magnetometer, sun sensors, and an inertial 
measurement system (IMU) with integrated 
Microelectromechanical System (MEMS) gyroscopes 
and accelerometers. For attitude control, the spacecraft 
contains two orthogonal torque rods for active magnetic 
control in order to detumble after deployment. The 
magnetometer, torque rods, and sun sensors were 
designed, built, and tested in-house. 
 
Figure 7: GT-1 Torque Rod 
A commercially available GPS receiver was included in 
the original spacecraft design. However, this 
component was de-scoped due to complications 
explained in the following lessons learned section. 
Likewise, the IMU was included in the design, but the 
module was de-scoped following damage and not 
included in the final integration. 
Other Elements 
Similar to the subsystems described in the previous 
sections, the spacecraft structure was designed and 
fabricated in-house. The aluminum 1U structure 
included a top and bottom plate, and two-piece side 
walls (Figure 8). 
 
 
Figure 8: GT-1 -Z Plate (left) and one piece of side 
wall (right) 
Temperature and power monitoring sensors were 
included for spacecraft health monitoring. Thermistors 
were placed on the solar panels and flight critical 
components such as the flight computers, batteries, and 
radio. Power monitoring was included on all major 
power consuming components and on each of the 12 
solar cell series strings. 
LESSONS LEARNED TO BE APPLIED TO THE 
GT-X BUS 
The integration and testing of the GT-1 spacecraft 
revealed both design flaws and strengths. These flaws 
necessitated late-term design changes, hardware 
modifications, and occasional descoping or other 
changes to the mission. From these challenges an 
extensive list of lessons learned is derived to assist in 
the planning and execution of future CubeSat missions. 
While the details of problems encountered may be 
specific to the GT-1 mission, the resolutions and 
extensions are phrased in a general sense to be broadly 
applicable to similar projects. These lessons are 
described in the following sections. 
Commercial (COTS) Component Repair and 
Managing Schedule Risk 
Throughout the mission lifetime, various components 
required repair or replacement. While most issues with 
components designed in-house could be resolved over a 
short timeline, issues with COTS components required 
more consideration as they greatly affected the mission 
schedule. In several cases, such as that of the GPS 
receiver, sending the component back for repair was a 
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multiweek process. A problem was discovered with the 
GPS a few days before the start of final integration and 
the GPS receiver was ultimately descoped since it the 
first PCB to be integrated into the avionics stack. At the 
time, waiting for the repair and subsequent subscale 
testing would have set integration back by more than a 
month. Ultimately, a schedule slip introduced additional 
time which could have been utilized to integrate a 
functional unit if swift action had been taken to send it 
back to the vendor. 
In situations where repair was not an option, obtaining a 
replacement typically required a lead time of multiple 
months. This was encountered with the IMU and the 
P31u, but different approaches were taken to resolve 
their issues. It was determined the IMU required a 
replacement well before integration began. However, 
the new part was set to arrive well past the original 
integration date, and therefore would have caused the 
satellite to miss the first launch opportunity. As such, 
the IMU was descoped early into the mission timeline 
since it was determined to not be critical to the 
satellite’s functionality. As for the P31u, the vendor 
was immediately contacted once a problem was 
observed a month before final integration, and after 
three weeks of correspondence the mission was 
recommended to obtain a new unit. As this too would 
have caused the mission to miss a launch opportunity 
and incur a significant financial cost, it was ultimately 
decided to modify the component and bypass the 
functionality causing issue.  
However, when critically analyzing the schedule, both 
components could have been reordered to ensure full 
functionality of the flight system. As the mission 
ultimately missed the first launch opportunity due to the 
COVID-19 pandemic, it would have been best to 
replace the units when the issues were discovered. 
Furthermore, the next mission in the GT-X series will 
utilize the same IMU, so a delayed component could 
simply transition to the next mission. The loss in 
functionality of the P31u affected the mission for the 
rest of its duration, as an accidental short on the 
satellite’s main board can be traced back to the bypass 
implemented. 
Ultimately, there was enough time to repair and replace 
all COTS components that caused issues on GT-1 since 
the first two delivery dates could not be met. The 
decisions to not repair these components were made 
under intense schedule pressure resulting in the 
dismissal of the option to accommodate a schedule slip 
in order to restore system functionality. Further 
discussion on the topic of creating a realistic schedule 
can be found in Set a Realistic Scope. 
Moving forward in the GT-X series, damaged or 
malfunctioning COTS components will be immediately 
sent back to vendors for repair. In cases where repair is 
not possible, replacements will be ordered regardless of 
lead time since the component may be used for a future 
mission if it is descoped from the originally planned 
mission. This second case is made possible by the 
nature of the GT-X series as an iterative design 
spanning multiple missions. For missions where this is 
not the case, realistically evaluating the schedule is 
vital. Ensuring the system works properly may be worth 
accepting a schedule slip, especially in missions where 
the schedule is already uncertain. 
Prioritizing Critical Bus Components 
Although there are many components and features 
(both in hardware and software) onboard a CubeSat and 
the team desires them all to be complete before launch, 
only specific components are mission critical (See 
Table 1). Keeping de-scope options available is an 
important aspect of space mission planning since 
launch opportunities are generally inflexible and the 
timeline of solving engineering challenges can be 
difficult to predict. However, only non-mission-critical 
components can be de-scoped from the mission, so 
prioritizing the mission-critical components early in the 
design, assembly, and test process is imperative to meet 
the mission schedule. 
Prioritization of simple but flight-critical components 
can seem counter-intuitive but is nevertheless worth 
considering. The GT-1 spacecraft’s battery hazard 
inhibit circuit is an example of an oversight in 
prioritizing a critical component. While the inhibit 
circuit (block diagram shown in Figure 5) is one of the 
most straightforward circuits to design on the 
spacecraft, it is arguably the most important. If this 
particular circuit does not meet payload requirements, 
the spacecraft cannot launch. The GT-1 team did not 
allocate additional time to develop a thorough 
understanding and ensure the inhibit circuit met 
requirements as it appeared simple to design relative to 
other circuits designed for the mission. Rather than 
supplying three independent battery hazard inhibits, the 
circuit was originally designed with only a single 
independent inhibit controlled by three trigger switches. 
The three trigger switches were mistakenly identified as 
three “independent” inhibits, but only controlled the 
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single inhibit mechanism. This circuit had to be 
redesigned and installed on the exterior of the 
spacecraft (Figure 9) after final integration which 
proved to be challenging and incurred additional risk to 
the mission. 
 
Figure 9: Inhibit Circuit Modification PCB (outlined 
in red) mounted on spacecraft -Z plate 
Similarly, the GT-1 spacecraft UHF radio is a flight-
critical component, yet it was one of the last 
components developed and tested due to its complexity. 
One team member held the tribal knowledge related to 
radio development and it was difficult to transfer this 
knowledge upon their graduation. As there was also no 
dedicated communications team on the GT-1 mission, 
this resulted in further delays while other team 
members scrambled late in the mission to become 
knowledgeable about this component in order to 
complete the radio development. 
For future GT-X missions, the critical satellite bus 
components will be identified and allocated more time 
and personnel for their development and testing. In 
particular, future missions will include a dedicated 
communications team for developing and testing the 
spacecraft radio and ground station links. 
Modularity 
Having easy access to electrical components inside the 
spacecraft at any time during the integration process is 
critical in an experimental or university CubeSat 
mission. While components should be individually 
acceptance tested before being integrated into the 
system, there will likely be failures that are unique to a 
fully integrated system. The GT-1 mission experienced 
a multitude of these failures including an incorrectly 
manufactured cable and a damaged component from an 
overcurrent condition elsewhere in the system. 
Especially when designing custom electronics without 
flight heritage, the ability to swap out damaged 
components during integration and testing is highly 
beneficial. 
The use of approximately 20 cable assemblies, all 
staked using epoxy for secondary retention, resulted in 
the GT-1 spacecraft being very difficult, if not 
impossible, to disassemble to replace damaged 
components.  
  
Figure 10: Many cable harnesses routed throughout 
GT-1 spacecraft 
When faced with a damaged component, the team 
generally opted to not disassemble the spacecraft and 
modified the internal hardware as little as possible by 
adding external circuits to bypass the internal faulty 
circuits. While the GT-1 team rarely disassembled the 
spacecraft after staking, the following provides insight 
on why spacecraft disassembly with a large number of 
staked cables is so difficult. Once cables have been 
staked with epoxy, the cable assemblies must be cut in 
order to disassemble the spacecraft. After replacing the 
damaged component, the GT-1 team developed several 
options for re-assembly:  
1) The cables could be soldered back together 
with increased risk of an electrical short to the 
structure and of a broken cable on orbit due to 
a poor solder joint. Similarly, cable plugs and 
sockets could be crimped to the cut wire ends 
and could be re-attached with a connector in 
the middle of the cable (rather than soldering) 
if available volume and wire length permit. 
2) The staking securing the cable plugs could be 
removed and the cable assemblies replaced. 
The cured staking was too strong to easily cut 
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through without risking the surrounding 
components making this option practically 
impossible. 
3) The PCB attached to the cut cable could be 
replaced entirely with a new connector 
receptacle and new cable assembly. Replacing 
more components than necessary can increase 
the cost of the mission substantially and result 
in lengthy schedule delays. 
4) A combination of the previous options on 
either end of the cut cable. 
Because the above-mentioned options are undesirable, 
it is recommended to prioritize ease of disassembly and 
reassembly as a primary goal during the spacecraft 
design process. While GT-1 was largely unsuccessful in 
achieving this modularity goal, our team recommends 
several improvements that will be implemented on the 
future GT-X satellites: 
1) Utilize board-to-board connectors rather than 
board-to-wire connections where possible. 
Cable assemblies are prone to error in their 
construction, occupy more volume, and have 
greater mass than a board-to-board solution. 
An incorrectly constructed cable installed in 
the GT-1 spacecraft caused an overcurrent 
condition in an electrical component resulting 
in spacecraft hardware modifications adding 
mass and risk to mission success.  
2) For connectors that must be board-to-wire, 
prefer non-permanent retention methods such 
as screw-locks. If cable plugs are secured 
using locking screws, the cable assembly can 
be easily detached during disassembly. 
Likewise, board-to-board connectors can be 
secured using screws and standoffs and can be 
easily disassembled when compared to a more 
permanent retention method such as staking. 
3) Plan to complete full integrated system testing 
prior to final integration to reduce instances of 
spacecraft disassembly. When staking 
integrated components is necessary, prefer 
withholding the staking until integrated system 
testing is complete. Once testing is complete, 
disassemble the spacecraft and re-assemble 
with staking for final integration. 
  
Figure 11: Harwin Gecko screw-lock connector8 
(left) and Samtec PC104 board-to-board connector9 
(right) 
Documentation 
Documentation was one area in which the mission 
showed considerable strength. Detailed mission 
documents were created for every integration and 
testing procedure facilitating smooth interactions with 
the flight hardware by preventing mistakes and 
oversights. These documents created standardized 
methods and templates for recording events and set best 
practices for future missions to follow. Blank templates 
allowed for iterative improvements to be made as the 
mission progressed. While performing the procedures, 
notes and observations were included in the margins in 
cases where the written steps did not suffice. Important 
documents, such as the completed integration 
procedure, were promptly scanned and uploaded to a 
server to remove reliance on a hardcopy. In addition to 
written documentation, photographs were taken at 
every milestone to create a visual record of the state of 
the system and components over time. A time-lapse of 
the satellite’s integration was recorded to supplement 
the extensive photographic documentation.  
These practices became increasingly important in the 
cases of anomalies. Separate non-conformance reports 
(NCR’s) and anomaly descriptions were written to aid 
in the troubleshooting and planning of a solution. The 
previously completed procedures were referenced to 
determine possible cause. In general, the photographs 
were typically the most helpful form of documentation. 
Being able to reference actual images of the satellite 
state at various points in time, both before and after an 
anomaly, was an invaluable resource.  
During tests of the deployable solar panels, anomalous 
behavior was observed on one of the burn wire 
mechanism PCBs. The root cause was speculated to be 
an overcurrent condition produced by a flipped cable 
which, with a reversed pinout, shorted power to ground. 
However, it was difficult to confirm this without taking 
apart the spacecraft. Photographs from the integration 
process taken just after several cable assemblies had 
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been installed confirmed that an incorrectly 
manufactured harness had indeed been installed into the 
spacecraft (Figure 12).   
 
Figure 12: Image taken during integration helped to 
resolve a cable problem later in testing 
For future GT-X missions, existing mission documents 
and test procedures will be updated with lessons learned 
from their previous uses. New documents will be 
created to track flight hardware interactions, including a 
log system to ensure proper quality assurance practices 
are being followed when working with mission critical 
hardware. As photographs were essential to anomaly 
troubleshooting, explicit steps will be added to all 
procedures to ensure any changes to the satellite will be 
photographed. Standalone procedures to photograph 
each component before it is integrated into the system 
will be written to provide a baseline for any anomalies. 
Furthermore, video records of hardware interactions 
will be obtained via an integrated camera in the GSE 
equipment. This camera will enable continuous 
monitoring and recording of interactions with flight 
hardware.  
Subscale Testing 
Subscale testing is of the utmost importance when 
integrating any complex system, especially high-risk 
systems such as CubeSats. While there is no “golden 
rule” for how granular subscale tests should be, and this 
depends heavily on specific subsystem or integration 
stage, it is important to baseline what subscale tests are 
applicable to the specific mission. If a software or 
hardware fault is detected far upstream of the last 
“known state” of the spacecraft, it is often difficult to 
determine the root cause of the problem. Attempting to 
debug the issue can result in additional risk being 
incurred to the system. Environmental and system level 
testing is also necessary but not discussed here. 
It is essential to know the state of the system to a high 
degree of certainty at all times and to recognize 
unknowns. Adopting a “test-as-you-go” method is 
especially risky as it is often unclear of when the next 
subscale test should occur. The GT-1 team was 
successful in planning milestone tests well in advance 
to ensure major changes to the spacecraft were 
successful but did employ the “test-as-you-go” 
methodology during substantial sections of the avionics 
integration due to schedule pressure. This resulted in 
power rail shorting, incorrectly connected signals, and 
incorrectly constructed cable assemblies. Some of these 
occurrences resulted in damage to the system and 
created schedule slips. More granular testing would 
have been invaluable – trading short-term labor and 
time for long-term schedule benefits. However, this can 
be limited by the bandwidth of experienced students 
needed to plan and carry out testing, which proved to be 
a challenge for the GT-1 mission. It is suggested to 
design all these subscale tests, no matter how simple, 
far in advance of integration to ensure issues similar to 
those above do not slip through the cracks. 
As mentioned before, the subscale testing frequency 
and detail are highly system dependent, but there are 
some standards for when such a test should occur. 
Subscale tests are classified into specific categories 
which can serve as a guide for whether and when such 
testing is needed. 
Sub-Assembly Testing is critical for components 
developed in-house. Often, a component will have 
several sub-assemblies which need to be discretely 
tested. A good example of this is the GT-1 main 
avionics board which houses the inhibit, burnwire, and 
solar panel interface circuitry. The team effectively 
tested each of these sub-assemblies which allowed for 
some non-conformities such as soldering irregularities 
to be identified early and easily resolved. Had the team 
conducted this testing at a higher level, these issues 
could have been discovered after the component was 
staked and conformal coated making any repair far 
more complex. 
Component Acceptance Testing should be conducted on 
all components, whether COTS or developed in-house, 
prior to integration into the system. Such testing should 
occur at least twice regardless of how the component is 
sourced. For COTS components, testing should occur 
immediately after receipt from the vendor to ensure no 
damage has occurred in shipping and the vendor has not 
overlooked any issues during checkout testing. Then, 
the components must be tested just prior to installation 
into the system to ensure they have not been damaged 
(possibly from long storage times or other intermediate 
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testing). A similar approach should be taken with in-
house developed components – testing after 
manufacture and prior to installation. Some additional 
testing may be warranted for these components 
following finishing processes such as potting, staking, 
or conformal coating as they may have unanticipated 
effects on the final component (damage during 
application, expansion/contraction during cure, etc.). 
The handling of the GPS receiver for GT-1 is an 
example of the need for proactive acceptance testing 
practices. The GT-1 team shipped the GPS receiver 
back to the vendor after it had been damaged from 
prolonged storage. The component was received by the 
GT-1 team but not immediately acceptance tested. By 
the time a new issue was identified which had not been 
detected by the vendor, the schedule was too mature to 
make the repair and the unit was ultimately descoped.  
Avionics Stack-Up Testing is an essential consideration, 
specifically when integrating a CubeSat. While each 
component should have been fully tested prior to 
assembly, irregularities can arise when these units are 
integrated together. It is suggested that testing occur 
after every component or part is mated with the stack. 
This might include an entire PC104 board, if it is to be 
mounted with board-to-board connectors directly to the 
stack, or even a single cable assembly connecting two 
circuits. Reasonable effort should be taken to “cold” 
test circuits (testing for continuity or open circuits on 
power, ground, and signal rails) prior to supplying 
power for a “hot” test. It may only be possible to 
conduct “cold” tests before the battery is integrated. 
This will avoid nonconformities which risk causing 
damage to systems from high current events. The GT-1 
team accidentally constructed a cable assembly with 
two signals swapped, which was not identified until the 
entire spacecraft was integrated and staked. The cable 
had to be cut and spliced resulting in reduced system 
functionality. More frequent and detailed Avionics 
Stack-Up Testing (particularly “cold” testing) could 
have prevented this permanent damage. 
Flight Software (FSW) Testing involves any functional 
test with previously untested flight software. If the 
system is well designed, it is possible to limit the risk of 
software testing by implementing circuit design to 
prevent errant or bugged code from damaging 
hardware, though this is not always possible. FSW 
testing must be conducted on an Engineering 
Development Unit (EDU) before upload to the 
spacecraft. This EDU can come in many forms: an 
entire Hardware-in-the-Loop Testbed (HITL), a 
duplicate component, or as simple as a breakout board 
with the flight processor onboard. The GT-1 team 
successfully employed a “FlatSat” (an EDU spacecraft 
with components disassembled and easily accessible 
shown in Figure 13) to identify software issues before 
uploading code to the spacecraft. This was largely 
successful except for an instance where the wrong 
version of the software was uploaded onto the 
spacecraft resulting in an anomalous solar panel 
deployment. The GT-1 “FlatSat” did not include 
circuitry to indicate when a deployment would occur, 
so this issue was not identified prior to upload to the 
spacecraft. As such, it is important that any testbed be 
as functionally identical to the flight unit as possible. 
 
Figure 13: GT-1 “FlatSat” Hardware-in-the-Loop 
Testbed 
Structural Fit Checks should occur at multiple stages in 
the CubeSat development process as the tight deployer 
tolerances impose equally strict structural dimension 
requirements. A JSSOD-R test pod was supplied for 
vibration testing and used for fit checks which proved 
invaluable in solving fit up issues as described in later 
sections. Structural fit checks should occur at least three 
times: after the structure is first machined, when the 
preliminary build of the spacecraft is complete, and 
when integration is complete. Each time, fasteners 
should be torqued to specification with a repeatable 
assembly process. It is often difficult to verify the 
parallelism and perpendicularity of the spacecraft rails, 
so these fit checks are an effective method for 
confirming alignment. The earlier in the integration 
process a structural alignment issue is identified, the 
simpler it is to resolve since re-machining or 
modification of the structure is still possible without 
fully disassembling the spacecraft.  
Note that there is no subsystem level testing mentioned 
above. While subsystem level testing can occur, the 
highly coupled nature of subsystems in CubeSats can 
make testing individual subsystems a challenge. Tests 
containing an entire subsystem and possibly aspects of 
other subsystems can be categorized into Avionics 
Stack-up Testing and should adhere to the same 
guidelines. 
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Ease of Fabrication and Assembly 
The design of spacecraft components should include 
consideration of their planned manufacturing process 
and whether the chosen method of fabrication can meet 
the required tolerances. Furthermore, assemblies of the 
fabricated components should work the same way each 
time and with a maximal amount of flexibility (“fool-
proofing”). 
One of the most significant issues encountered during 
integration was poor fit of the spacecraft inside the test 
pod simulating the orbital deployer. This test pod was 
provided by JAXA to be used during testing to ensure 
that the assembled satellite will fit inside the launch 
case during integration and to be used for vibration 
testing. Upon initial assembly, GT-1 could be inserted 
into the test pod but could not slide freely, as required 
by the JEM Payload Accommodation Handbook ICD, 
and would bind at several points along the rails. The 
quality of the fit varied significantly depending on the 
order in which the various primary structural elements 
were torqued and based on the torque patterns used on a 
given face. These fit issues illustrate the importance of 
repeatable assembly procedures and designing parts for 
manufacturability. 
  
Figure 14: J-SSOD Test Pod with GT-1 spacecraft 
and two 1U mass simulators 
The troubleshooting process identified several likely 
causes for the improper fit in the test pod: machining 
errors which created nonconforming part dimensions, 
lack of proper tolerancing in the design, and poor 
structural design in which the CubeSat rails are divided 
among three different parts. 
Investigation uncovered that as the GT-1 primary 
structure was being fabricated, a mistake in the 
operation of one of the machines reduced the as-built 
width of the walls of the structure. The fact that the 
structure still assembled and fit inside the test pod was 
taken as proof that the error was acceptable. However, 
this nonconformity had not been quantified and 
compared back to design tolerances to identify whether 
it was acceptable and what, if any, corrective action 
was necessary. The structure ultimately remained 
within specifications after required procedural changes 
allowed for repeatable, in-specification assembly. This 
machining error also highlights the need for quality 
control in design processes and the importance of 
designing parts that are easy to fabricate. 
Designing for manufacturability is generally not easy 
and may require some iteration, particularly if 
fabrication is being performed by less-experienced 
student machinists. When considering how a part will 
be fabricated, it is necessary to determine not just 
whether a particular machining operation is possible, 
but how difficult it will be.  These concerns could 
include very tight hole placement tolerances or complex 
geometries that make it difficult to clamp or otherwise 
restrain a workpiece during machining. If a particular 
machine shop or facility has already been identified 
prior to design (such as an on-campus facility), the staff 
machinists should be consulted during design to 
provide input on capabilities (tools/operations available 
and their precisions) as well as to consult on how parts 
should or could be fabricated (order and type of 
operations). 
In order to properly control the quality of machining 
processes, tolerances must be included in the design 
flowing down from the constraints and tolerances of the 
ICD. Individual part dimensions and tolerances should 
be constructed such that parts conforming to those 
designs will fit together properly and correctly interface 
with the deployment mechanism. Taking as-built 
measurements of the final fabricated parts allows 
verification of conformance. In the event that one or 
more dimensions is non-conforming, such 
measurements allow analysis to be performed to 
determine whether the as-built parts will fit together 
and what corrective action is needed to repair them. 
Considering tolerances during design and measuring 
parts after fabrication is essential to confirm that the 
final assembly of parts will fit within overall constraint 
tolerances and to understand the consequences of any 
mistakes or nonconformities during fabrication. 
In addition to poor quality control processes, several 
design decisions also contributed to the structural fit 
issues. The rails on the edges of the satellite form the 
interface with the orbital deployer (and the test pod) 
and thus their dimensions, placement, and orientation 
must be tightly controlled. On GT-1, each rail is formed 
by segments of three separate parts: one end on the top 
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plate, a segment of the wall, and another end on the 
bottom plate. All three of these parts were machined 
entirely independent of one another and so slight 
variation in any single part degrades the quality of the 
entire rail, thus impairing the alignment of the satellite 
rails. It is believed that this three-part rail design was 
the largest contributor to the poor structural fit, 
especially in light of the machining error with the walls. 
Since the rails are so vital to the interface of the 
CubeSat with the deployer and any other external 
features, a structural design in which the entire length 
of the rail is contained within a single part is highly 
desirable and has been adopted for the GT-2 structure. 
If it is impossible to make the rails in a single part, 
perhaps due to a need for more access, the rails should 
be machined in a single operation early in the 
fabrication process. 
Another design choice that impaired the structural fit 
was the use of countersunk fasteners for the assembly 
of all the primary structure components. The use of a 
countersunk fastener (instead of a counterbore with a 
socket head fastener) adds a constraint to the interface 
by enforcing concentricity between the threads in the 
substrate and the countersink in the bolt-side part. Since 
the placement of the threads and countersinks cannot be 
controlled with exact precision, any more than two 
countersunk fasteners will over-constrain the interface 
and introduce internal strains in the parts being fastened 
together. 
A better design uses socket head fasteners with a 
clearance hole in the bolt-side part. In the case where 
the clearance hole is slightly larger than the fastener, 
the interface is only constrained normal to the interface 
when the fastener(s) are torqued into place. This allows 
a more precise feature, such as dowel pin holes 
machined into both parts in a single operation early in 
fabrication, to be used to reliably align the assembly. A 
counterbore could also be included if clearance of the 
bolt head is an issue provided that the counterbored 
hole is slightly larger than the head of the fastener. 
Separate from the design process, the measurement and 
testing of the structural components prior to integration 
failed to detect the fit-up issues that would later 
manifest. Several structural fit-ups were performed 
where the primary structure was assembled and fit-
checked inside of the test pod. To eliminate the need for 
clean bench and electrostatic discharge (ESD) 
procedures, each component in the avionics stack was 
replaced by a 3D printed replica of the same size but 
not the same mass. The accuracy of the subsequent tests 
was thus limited because the resulting "dummy" 
satellite was not a mass-accurate replica of the flight 
system. When the structural fit-up issues manifested 
during integration, it became apparent that the mass of 
the avionics stack must be causing deformation of the 
structure to a degree that impacts the fit-up of the 
satellite in the test pod. For future missions, structural 
fit-ups will be performed with more accurate stand-in 
components that approximate both the size and mass of 
their actual flight counterparts. Improving the accuracy 
of this test setup will increase the likelihood that any 
future structural fit-up issues are identified as early on 
in the mission as possible. 
Repeatability is essential to achieving proper quality 
control, and a robust assembly procedure that leaves no 
room for interpretation is not just good practice but can 
also help to account for poor design or fabrication. The 
very detailed structural assembly procedure developed 
for GT-1 allowed the team to create a baseline state of 
the system from which experimentation with different 
assembly methods and torque patterns was possible. By 
keeping a detailed log of each of these changes and 
deviations along with the resulting outcome, it was 
possible to develop via trial-and-error a procedure to 
successfully assemble the satellite with proper fit-up in 
the test pod. 
Resolving Nonconformities 
Throughout the integration and testing of the GT-1 
CubeSat there were several anomalies that created 
nonconformities, some of which have been discussed in 
previous sections, and required lengthy troubleshooting 
to resolve. Even with meticulous planning and iterative 
improvements from these lessons learned, there will 
always be "unknown unknowns", and so it is vital to 
have a reliable, established procedure for 
troubleshooting hardware issues. 
Before outlining and describing an example of such a 
procedure as implemented during the GT-1 mission, it 
is important to consider several factors. The first is that 
hardware modifications during and after integration 
always carry additional mission risk, and so any 
solution that resolves the problem at hand without such 
a modification (a software fix or a change in the 
mission Concept of Operations) should always be 
preferred. The second is that it is critical to not further 
damage the satellite or any components when 
investigating or resolving nonconformities. This means 
that as soon as an anomaly occurs or is identified, the 
satellite should be returned to the most recent safe, 
stable configuration and any test or operation to be 
performed should be thoroughly considered to make 
certain the situation will not worsen. 
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The troubleshooting process used to resolve 
nonconformities during the GT-1 mission can be 
outlined as shown below: 
1) Stabilize the system. 
2) Identify the problem. 
3) Determine root causes. 
4) Consider alternative solutions. 
5) Develop a detailed procedure. 
6) Practice the procedure on non-flight hardware. 
7) Perform the modification on the satellite. 
8) Thoroughly test the system. 
This process is iterative with both major and minor 
loops to allow new information to be continually 
incorporated and incremental improvements to be 
included after testing. For example, anything learned 
during the practice run in step 6 should be used to 
improve the procedure from step 5 which should be 
tested again in step 6 and so on. 
Stabilizing the system is the most vital step as discussed 
earlier and allows time to properly consider every 
possible cause and solution. It is very important not to 
rush any step in this process as schedule pressure often 
leads to mistakes and poor decisions. The next step is to 
identify the problem. This process should work from 
the highest level of the outward system behavior (i.e. 
satellite does not activate when deployed) and progress 
downward with ever-refining detail of the state of every 
relevant component in the system. This should naturally 
lead into a determination of the root cause(s) since a 
definition of the complete system state will include any 
components that appear or behave in unusual ways 
indicating damage or failure. Steps 2 and 3 should 
involve tests performed on the satellite to quantify any 
relevant system parameters to both identify and confirm 
plausible root causes. 
Once a root cause has been identified, possible 
solutions should be brainstormed and as many 
alternatives as possible should be considered. The 
characteristics of competing solutions should be 
compared including cost, difficulty, feasibility, required 
time/schedule delay, impaired system performance, and 
consequence of failure. Most importantly, the additional 
mission risk imposed by a given solution should be 
determined at least in a relative sense. The ideal 
solution may not always be the one that carries the 
lowest mission risk, but that is likely to be the case. To 
move from step 4 to step 5, a preferred solution should 
be identified, but it is also a good idea to maintain one 
or more additional solutions as backup or secondary 
options. 
The importance of the next two steps, to develop a 
detailed procedure and practice this procedure on non-
flight hardware, cannot be overemphasized. As 
discussed earlier, there should be some iteration 
between these steps to incrementally improve the 
procedure, and it is also possible that either writing or 
practicing the procedure will reveal that a particular 
solution is either impossible or riskier than initially 
believed which could prompt a return to step 4 and 
selection of a different alternative. In order to achieve 
consistent, reliable results, it is necessary to allocate 
significant effort into writing a detailed procedure to 
properly control the process, and into creating as 
accurate a test setup as possible to properly simulate the 
actual system. The less accurate a procedure or test 
setup is, the more uncertainty there is in whether the 
solution will actually be successful, and the greater 
likelihood that an unexpected error will be encountered 
when performing the final modification on the flight 
hardware. Figure 15 shows the test setup used to 
practice the GT-1 inhibit circuit modification using a 
3D printed spacecraft structure (Figure 9 shows the 
installed inhibit circuit on the spacecraft). 
 
Figure 15: Inhibit Circuit Modification Test Setup 
Once the procedure has been tested and refined, the 
time has come to actually perform the modification on 
the satellite hardware. Meticulous care should be taken 
to follow the procedure developed earlier as precisely 
as possible. This task should include testing whenever 
possible throughout the process to confirm that each 
step has succeeded and that no further damage has been 
done to the satellite. It is important to understand 
which, if any, steps or sequences need to be performed 
in quick succession and which are partially or 
completely irreversible. Any such irreversible actions 
should be left as late in the procedure as possible. It is 
important when performing hardware modifications to 
not blindly plow ahead. If something differs from the 
practice setup or a new problem or piece of information 
is discovered, immediately halt the procedure and take 
time to consider the new implications and take 
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appropriate action. This may even include circling back 
in the troubleshooting procedure by stabilizing the 
system and testing out a new method before 
proceeding. 
Once the modification is complete, functional tests 
should be performed to confirm that the system is 
behaving as expected, that the original nonconformity 
has been resolved, any modifications are working as 
expected, and that no other system functions have been 
unexpectedly impaired or removed. Any 
nonconformities discovered through such testing should 
be resolved in a similar manner as discussed above with 
specific care and attention paid to any such issues 
which may have been caused by the solution procedure 
itself. Consideration should also be made of any 
system-level environmental tests which could be 
affected by the modification and now need to be 
repeated or retested (for example, any modification to 
the structure should necessitate performing vibration 
testing again). 
Set a Realistic Scope 
The original scope of the GT-1 mission was beyond 
what was possible in the preliminary time allotted. 
Hence, much of the planned functionality was descoped 
to ensure deadlines could be met. The ADC system 
sacrificed the most functionality with the descoping of 
the GPS receiver and IMU. The loss of the IMU 
necessitated the descoping of the attitude estimator 
leaving just the magnetometer to implement a detumble 
system using B-dot control with two torque rods. More 
wide-ranging functionality losses were seen in flight 
software, with hardware available onboard the 
spacecraft for tasks such as data logging and voltage 
and current monitoring but no time to develop the 
software. Software components were descoped well 
after the final build of the satellite was complete, most 
recently with development of the over the air update 
component halted to allow focus on more mission 
critical components.  
The first thing to consider when determining the scope 
and timeline of such a mission is to recognize the scope 
of personnel. As GT-1 was fully staffed by 
undergraduate students, it was vital to recognize that 
many could not contribute more than the weekly hours 
they had committed to. This was especially apparent 
during school breaks when many students were 
unavailable. Additionally, for many students, GT-1 was 
their first experience working on a spacecraft. 
Therefore, they required time to be onboarded and learn 
all the skills required to make progress on such a 
mission. Hence, many aspects of the mission extended 
past the allotted period as it simply took longer to make 
progress. Furthermore, it is impossible to speak about 
the timeline of GT-1 without mentioning to effect of the 
COVID-19 pandemic. The mission was affected most 
notably with fewer students on campus available to 
assist with integration and testing causing those on 
campus to work long hours to compensate. However, 
the time necessary to develop the minimum viable 
software build would have delayed the project 
regardless. The months lost to the pandemic would not 
have been enough to ensure the mission launched when 
originally slated to. 
Ultimately, the GT-1 mission suffered from a lack of 
student experience and flight heritage as it is the 
pathfinder spacecraft in a series. It was impossible to 
gauge the time and effort certain tasks would require as 
they had never been performed by any of the members 
before. One such example is the simulated 
communications (SimCom) test wherein the link budget 
would be verified. The test had been planned for 
February 2021 but will be unable to be completed until 
June 2021. The level of technical difficulty and test 
logistics were severely underestimated, and thus work 
began on test preparations late in the mission timeline. 
Since the required time and effort far exceeded that 
allotted to the test, SimCom has significantly delayed 
the mission timeline.  
Future GT-X missions benefit from the iterative nature 
of the system, with students ideally remaining on the 
project for multiple spacecraft and therefore passing 
knowledge down to the next group of students. This 
includes both technical skills and general experience 
with design, integration, and testing. Thorough 
documentation from experienced students will assist in 
this effort. Additionally, as each satellite will improve 
upon the next, the same mistakes should not be 
repeated. Therefore, future missions will be able to set 
more reasonable, yet aggressive, timelines and scopes. 
A new addition to the mission process will be 
independent design reviews. Experienced reviewers 
will have the ability push back on design decisions to 
ensure feasibility with respect to both mission scope 
and timeline. These reviewers will be students from 
previous GT-X missions and graduate students with 
experience in building small satellites. By consulting 
individuals not directly involved with the mission, 
   
 
Kolhof, et al. 15 35th Annual 
  Small Satellite Conference 
students will be able to obtain impartial feedback on the 
mission design and scope rather than falling into the 
dangers of groupthink. Mission decisions and designs 
will need to be supported by convincing arguments and 
a thorough engineering process, preventing members of 
future GT-X missions from repeating similar mistakes. 
While every mission differs, the following questions 
should be answered early into a mission’s timeline to 
ensure a greater chance of success when organizing a 
schedule. 
1) Are those working on the mission able to 
dedicate the time necessary to meet mission 
milestones?  
2) Is the time allotted to mission critical 
components comparable to allotments from 
similar missions? 
3) How much margin has been included in the 
mission schedule? Is it sufficient? 
If the answers to any of these questions raise concern, it 
is vital to reevaluate the mission scope and schedule. It 
is sometimes best to reduce scope or extend the 
schedule to ensure mission success, rather than rushing 
and launching a system that may or may not perform as 
designed. A comparison of the GT-1 and GT-2 
schedules is shown in Table 2 to highlight how these 
considerations have been re-evaluated between 
missions.  










5 months 8 months 6 months 
Software 
Development 
9 months 23 months 12 months 
Integration 2 weeks 2 months 2 months 
Test 1 month 9 months 5 months 
 
As the GT-X series is iterative, GT-2 benefits from the 
developments of GT-1. While the software is the easiest 
component to port over from the previous satellite, GT-
2 is allotting 12 months to the task ensuring new 
members are provided ample time to familiarize 
themselves with the software framework and 
architecture. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Ultimately, new CubeSat teams must develop their own 
tribal knowledge over the course of several projects to 
determine what approaches are appropriate given the 
schedule, budget, and risk of their respective missions. 
Unlike private or governmental missions, commonly 
accepted NASA and military standards cannot be 
applied in a strict sense due to the intrinsic rapid 
timeline accompanying CubeSat missions. However, 
while each mission is unique, development does not 
need to be an isolated endeavor. Much knowledge can, 
and should, be passed between different CubeSat teams.  
The aim of this paper was to provide some experience-
driven guidance and help bring inexperienced CubeSat 
teams into the mindset required for a successful 
mission. An inexperienced team has every opportunity 
to be successful if risks and weaknesses are identified 
early and mitigated. The lessons learned presented in 
this paper should help teams avoid similar mistakes and 
establish a mindset to cope with further “unknown 
unknowns” which may arise in their unique missions.  
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